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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In December of 1982f after a jury trial before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinsonf in the Third Judicial District Court 
of Summit County, State of Utah, respondent Dalbo, Inc., was 
awarded a judgment of $199,500.00 against appellant, Martin R. 
Lingwall. Thereafter, appellant filed a Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or Alternatively for a New Trial. An 
Order was subsequently entered by the Court on June 7, 1984, 
denying said motion. It is from this Order that the appellant now 
appeals. 
For purposes of this appeal, Martin Lingwall will be 
referred to as plaintiff/appellant and Dalbo, Inc., will be 
referred to as defendant/respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant petitions this Court to reverse the District 
Court's denial of plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial and asks that 
this case be remanded for a new trial to be conducted in accordance 
with the opinion of this Court. 
FACTS 
On September 5, 1981, an accident occurred on a road near 
Chalk Creek Canyon, Summit County, Utah. (Tr. 24, 27-30; R. 5, 16.) 
The accident involved a collision between a truck and a motorcycle. 
(R. 5, 16.) The truck was owned by Dalbo, Inc. (R. 5, 16.) It was 
driven by an employee of Dalbo, Dale Randolph Peel, in the course 
of his employment. (Tr. 30; R. 5, 16.) The motorcycle was driven 
by Martin R. Lingwall with Annette Belden riding behind Mr. 
Lingwall as a passenger. (R. 5, 16.) 
-3-
This action was originally commenced by Annette Belden as 
plaintiff against Dale Peel and Dalbol Inc. (R. 1.) The 
defendants, Dale Peel and Dalbo, Inc., filed a third-party 
complaint against third-party defendant Martin R. Lingwall claiming 
a right to contribution. (R. 5, 16.) Third-party defendant Martin 
R. Lingwall counterclaimed for damages against Dale Peel and Dalbo, 
Inc. (R. 22.) The matters at issue between Annette Belden and Dale 
court and a stipulation 
with the court prior to 
Peel and Dalbo, Inc., were settled out of 
was entered into by all parties and filed| 
trial. (R. 88.) 
Trial on the action commenced November 30, 1982. During 
the proceeding and over the objection of plaintiff's counsel, the 
Court allowed testimony to be heard by the jury regarding Mr. 
Lingwall's extra-marital relationship with Annette Belden. Tr. 
183-185.) At the close of evidence the jury was given instruction 
and began its deliberations. (Tr. 515; ij. 203-245.) While trying 
confused. It requested to reach a verdict the jury became 
additional instruction regarding the ejffect of its finding of 
comparative negligence. (R. 266, 277.) The Court declined to give 
additional instruction and referred t|he jury to instructions 
already given. (R. 266, 277.) 
The jury returned the special verdict as follows (R. 
246-248.): 
1. At the time and place 
conditions as shown by the 
in question and under the 
evidence were Dalbo, Inc. 
and Dale Randolph Peel negligent 
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ANSWER: Yes. 
2. Was such negligence the proximate cause of the 
accident? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
3. At the time and place in question and under the 
conditions as shown by the evidence, was Martin R. 
Lingwall negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
4. Was such negligence of Martin R. Lingwall the 
proximate cause of his own injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
5. If you have answered questions 2 and 4 "Yes", then 
answer this question: Considering all the negligence 
that caused the accident at One Hundred Percent (100%), 
what percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
(a) Dalbo, Inc. and Dale R. Peel: 30% 
(b) Martin R. Lingwall: 70% 
(c) Total: 100% 
6. Set forth the amount of damages that you find 
Martin R. Lingwall has suffered as a result of the 
injuries received in the accident in question: 
Lost Income (present): $28,000.00 
Lost Income (future): 20,000.00 
Medical Expenses: 16,083.00 
General Damages: 5,000.00 
Total: $69,083.00 
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7. At the time the accident occurred was the road 
where it occurred: 
(a) A public road, or 
(b) A private road? 
ANSWER: A private road. 
Based on this verdict, Mr. LingWall was non-suited and 
ordered to pay Dalbof Inc. $199,500.00 on it's claim for 
contribution. (R. 246-248? 252.) 
Plaintiff then moved the District Court for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial. (R. 261.) Both motions 
were denied. (R. 295.) 
Plaintiff now appeals to this Ccjurt for relief from the 
decision of the District Court, claiming ajs error the following: 
1. Error in not instruction the jury as to the 
consequences of their apportionment of negligence between the 
parties. (Tr. 637; R. 137, 262, 265-270.) 
2. Error in refusing to apply the holding of Dixon v. 
Stewart, 658 P. 2d 591 (Utah 1982), decided while this case was 
pending, to plaintiff's motion for new trial. (R. 262, 265, 270.) 
3. Error in allowing defendants1 counsel to question 
plaintiff at length regarding his personal relationship with 
Annette Belden. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. This case was tried within one month before the Utah 
Supreme Court decided Dixon v. Stewart!, supra. Dixon held that 
upon request the trial court shall instruct the jury on the direct 
of their finding of comparative negligenjce. 
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In the instant case, the trial court's refusal to instruct 
the jury on its finding of comparative negligence led to the same 
error as was found in Dixon, that being improper jury confusion 
resulting in an anomalous jury verdict. 
The jury's confusion in this case and in Dixon is close to 
being identical. Based on the same reasoning as expressed in 
Dixon, this Court should remand this case to the District Court to 
be decided in accordance with the law, as expressed in Dixon. 
II. The District Court erred in denying appellant's motion 
for new trial. The District Court biased its decision on its 
refusal to give limited retroactive effect to Dixon v. Stewart, 
supra, a case decided by this Court while appellant's motion was 
pending before the lower court. Because the law changed before the 
final judgment was entered in this case, appellant should have the 
benefit of the new rule. 
III. The District Court abused its discretion in admitting 
testimony concerning appellant's extra-marital relationship with 
Annette Belden. This evidence prejudiced appellant by the jury to 
decide the issue of liability based on appellant's ethical conduct 
rather than on whether appellant acted negligently at the time of 
the accident. 
ARGUMENT 
At trial this suit was heard to determine the comparative 
liabilities between plaintiff, Martin Lingwall, and defendant, 
Dalbo, Inc., respectively appellant and respondent on this appeal. 
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After the close of evidence the jlury was instructed and 
sequestered for deliberation. While trying to reach a verdict, the 
jury became confused on the effect their finding of comparative 
negligence would have on the parties. In an attempt to eliminate 
the confusion the foreman of the jury requested the trial court for 
additional instruction. The Court denied the request and referred 
the jury to instructions already given. (Rj 266, 277.) 
The jury subsequently returned a special verdict finding 
Mr. Lingwall 70% negligent and Dalbo, bn, 30% negligent. In 
addition, Mr. Lingwall was found to have suffered damages totaling 
$69,083.00, a sum much less than originally prayed for. (R. 
246-248.) 
Based on the jury's verdict, the Trial Court entered 
judgment in December, 1982. Plaintiff, Lingwall, was non-suited 
and ordered to pay defendant $199,500.Ofc) on its cross-claim for 
contribution. (R. 252.) 
In interviews with the juror^ after the trial [See 
Affidavits, Appendix A], it was revealed that (1) due to inadequate 
instruction the jury had, indeed, been confused because of the 
nature of the special verdict and the lack of knowledge as to what 
was actually being decided; and, (2) that the jury had intended to 
award Mr. Lingwall damages, but because of the Court's failure to 
give instruction of the effect of the jury's finding of 
comparative negligence, they were precluded from being able to 
J 
properly determine the facts and submit a verdict that reflected 
their desired result. 
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Thereafter, plaintiff brought motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdicts and for a new trial. On motion for 
anew trialf plaintiff listed as error the Court's failure to 
instruct the jury regarding their finding of comparative 
negligence. Plaintiff based his argument on Dixon v. Stewart/ 650 
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), a Utah Supreme Court case decided while 
plaintiff's motion was pending before the District Court. 
Dixon involved a wrongful death suit brought by the family 
of a pedestrian struck and fatally injured by defendant driver. 
The jury found plaintiff's decedent 60% negligent and the driver of 
the car that fatally injured him 40% negligent. On appeal to this 
Court, the plaintiff alleged error in the Trial Court's failure to 
instruct the jury as to the consequences of the apportionment of 
negligence between the parties. 
In the Dixon decision the Utah Supreme Court found that 
similar confusion existed among the jurors in that case as occurred 
in the District Court below. 
Prior to Dixon, Utah law held it was "prejudicial error if, 
in a comparative negligence case, the Court instructs the jury as 
to the effect or impact its fact finding answers and any special 
verdict will have on the outcome of the case." McGinn v. Utah 
Power and Light Co., 529 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1975). 
The evidence demonstrates negligence on the part 
of both parties. The verdict form shows that the jury 
foreman originally entered the 40%-60% split in the 
opposite order, that is, he showed the plaintiff as 40% 
negligent and the defendant as 60% negligent. 
Subsequently, a line was drawn through those two 
figures and they were reversed. In addition, the 
amount entered as damages was very much reduced from 
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the amount prayed for by the plaintiffs, indicating a 
likelihood that the jurors thohght they were awarding 
the plaintiffs an amount reduced by the percent of 
their decedant's negligence. 
In overruling McGinn, the Court! concluded that: 
There seems to be no good reason and logic or 
current law for this Court to give its sanction to the 
perpetuation of such confusion. Consequently, we 
overrule the decision in McQinn, and hold that if 
requested, a trial court must! inform the jury of the 
effect of apportioning to the plaintiff 50% or more of 
the negligence it finds in af comparative negligence 
case, if the effect of such an instruction will not be 
to confuse or mislead the juryj 
Dixon, supra, at 31. 
In the instant case, the Trial Coiirt apparently felt Dixon 
had no bearing in deciding whether Mr. Li ngwall was entitled to a 
new trial. Presumably this was so because Dixon had been decided 
after judgment had been entered by the Trial Court, albeit while 
plaintiff's motion was pending and had rjiot been Utah law at the 
time of trial. In refusing to give Djixon limited retroactive 
effect, plaintiff's motions were denied. 
Plaintiff now appeals to this Cojirt to decide whether the 
District Court erred in its discretion not to apply the Dixon 
holding and denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Appellant 
requests this Court to grant limited retroactivity to Dixon v. 
Stewart and to remand this case to the District Court to be decided 
in accordance with the law announced in that decision. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON THE EFFECT OF THEIR FINDING OF COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE. 
It is appellant's position that had not Dixon v. Stewart, 
supra, been decided this case would have prompted the overruling of 
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McGinn v. Utah Power and Light Co., supra. In both this case and 
Dixon, the confusion experienced by the jury led to an equally 
severe prejudicial effect on the plaintiff. Factually, the dilemma 
faced by the two juries is almost indistinguishable. The major 
difference between Dixon and the case at bar is that here 
defendants, in the lower court, brought a third-party claim for 
contribution. 
On motion for new trial brought by Mr. Lingwall in District 
Court, Dalbo argued that to have instructed the jury according to 
the rule announced in Dixon would hcive necessarily prejudiced 
defendant. In giving such an instruction the jury would have been 
informed of defendant's out of court settlement with Annette Belden 
and the resulting claim for contribution. Dalbo argued that from 
this knowledge the jury would have inferred an admission of 
negligence on the defendant's part and perhaps based an estimation 
of plaintiff's damages on the dollar figure in the out of court 
settlement. 
Appellant disagrees with this argument for the following 
reasons. 
At a minimum, a Dixon instruction, if appropriate, would 
have informed the jury of the consequences of finding the plaintiff 
50% or more negligent. Dixon, supra, at 596. In such an 
instruction the jury would be informed that the plaintiff would be 
non-suited if found primarily negligent. Appellant does not 
dispute the unfairness to defendant had the jury been instructed of 
the out of court settlement with the original plaintiff, Annette 
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Belden, and the claim of contribution agaijnst the plaintiff. But 
appellant's point is that the Court could have given an instruction 
that would have been fair to both parties, one that would have 
allowed the jury to reach a verdict with knowledge of the result of 
the apportionment of liability, as per Dixpn, by stopping short of 
exposing defendant's pre-trial settlement and cross-claim 
Such an instruction would have remedied the jury's 
confusion, as discussed in Dixon. It would have allowed the jury 
to accurately apportion liability and resulting damages in relation 
to their specific finding of facts. A determination of the 
existence or the amount of defendant's counter-claim for 
contribution, based on such a verdict, would then become a simple 
matter of accounting. See e.g., Dessaur v. Memorial General 
Hospital, 628 P.2d 337 (N.M. 1981). 
It seems evident that there is as I clear a need in this case 
for additional instruction as that found in Dixon. 
Here it would appear that not only was the jury confused as 
to what they were being asked to decide, in terms of liability, but 
apparently tried to arrive at an estimate 
computing an amount reduced by the percent of his negligence. Such 
an anomalous result was found intolerable to the court in Dixon and 
should be recognized as such in this case. 
II. DIXON V. STEWART SHOULP BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED 
TO THIS CASE WHICH WAS PENDING WHEN DIXON WAS DECIDED. 
In Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County Bd., 657 P.2d 
257, 264 (Utah 1982), this Court recognized the various retroactive 
applications given to judicial decisions!: 
of plaintiff's damages by 
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The application may be to parties and facts of 
the case where the new rule is announced, to pending 
cases, to future initiated cases arising from earlier 
events, or in some rare instances, to terminated cases 
which are subject to collateral attack, (Emphasis added) 
"A decisions operative effect is treated as a function of 
judicial policy [and] is left to the discretion of the Court." 
Loyal Order of Moose No. 259, supra at 264. 
It is plaintiff's position that because his case had not 
been finally decided and was pending at the time Dixon was decided, 
he should have the benefit of the new rule. In Utah, an action is 
pending until final determination on appeal or until the time to 
appeal has passed. Young et.ux. v. Hansen et.ux., 218 P.2d 674, 
675 (Utah 1950). 
The interests of finality and fairness would not be 
threatened by giving appellant the benefit of a subsequent change 
in the law. See Andrews v. Morris, 669 P.2d 81, 95 (Utah 1983). 
Appellant is aware that the Court must balance the need to 
apply a decision retroactively against a situation where overruled 
law has been justifiably relied upon or where retroactive operation 
creates a burden. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Farmers 
Insurance, 27 Utah 2d. 166, 493 P.2d 1002 (1972). But, even though 
respondent may have justifiably relied on the prior law of McGinn 
during the trial phase of litigation, to deny appellant the benefit 
of the Dixon decision on appeal would unfairly allow respondent the 
advantage of having the entire case decided on law that has since 
been overruled. This result would seem to offend the concept of 
fairness and create the greater injustice. 
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III, THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT7!? 
EXTRA-MARITAL RELATIONSHIP WITH|ANNETTE BELDEN. 
Appellant1 s last claim of error is based on the Trial 
Court's permission allowing defendant's counsel to cross-examine 
Mr. Lingwall about his involvement with Annette Belden. 
Rule 45
 f Utah Rules of Evidence J effective at time of 
trial, provides in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise provided, the judge may in 
his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its 
probative value is substantially outweighted by the 
risk that its admission will, ... (b) create a 
substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing 
the issues or of misleading th& jury. 
It is appellant's position that evidence before the jury 
showing appellant's extra-marital affair with Annette Belden was 
infinitely more prejudicial than whatever probativeness it might 
have had in determining what Mr. Lingwall's state of mind was up 
until the time of the accident. 
On cross examination, and over thd objection of appellant's 
counsel, the following testimony was heard by the jury. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p.183, In.5) 
Q. Did you get sufficient Sleep the night before so 
you were alert and knew what you were doing as you were driving 
just prior to the accident? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. You weren't thinking of &ny of the consequences of 
being with Annette Belden as you were drijving down that road, then? 
A. No, sir. 
-14-
Q. You weren't concerned about what your wife might 
think about. 
(Objection and discussion) 
THE COURT: You may proceed as far as any further 
foundation. 
Q. (By Mr. Heath) You were married at that time, were 
you not? 
A. I still am. 
Q. My question to you, were you married to the woman 
you are married to now at the time? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. Did you ask your wife if you could take Annette to 
Cowboy Days? 
A. Nof I didn't. 
Q, Dud she know Annette was with you? 
A. No, my wife was in Los Angeles. 
Q. Did you consider the fact that you would be telling 
he that you had Annette with you up in Evanston and then Elk 
hunting? 
A. If she would have asked me, I would have told her. 
I didn't keep any secrets. 
Q. She wouldn't have objected to that? 
A. I can't answer that question. 
Q. I see. 
A. She may have objected, yes. 
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Q. I think the question really!is, were you feeling at 
all guilty about being out there without your wife and being with 
another woman? 
A, No, sir. 
Q. As you were driving down? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. It didn't divert your attention? 
A. No, sir. 
Admitting evidence of appellantjs extra-marital affair 
before a jury that was overwhelmingly Mormon and conservative not 
only prejudiced appellant by depicting him as morally dishonest, 
but also allowed the jury to determine liability based on 
appellant's ethical conduct rather than Ion whether he had acted 
negligently at the time of the accident. 
It is true that, in matters of determining materiality the 
trial court should be accorded a large measure of discretion. 
Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977), but 
where this discretion has been abused the Trial Court may be 
reversed. Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 
314 (Utah 1979). 
The factual issues to be decided(by the jury at trial were 
I 
extremely close. The accident between appellant's motorcycle and 
respondent's Mack Truck took place in the middle of a one lane dirt 
road. And, because this road connected(with a public highway and 
I 
traversed various private properties, there was some question as to 
whether the accident had taken place on (a public or private road. 
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The public-private finding determined whether Utah's, then 
constitutional, Automobile liable on respondent's cross-claim for 
contribution. 
Under these circumstances, the lower court should have been 
more cautious in admitting testimony dealing with appellant's 
relationship with Annette Belden. In the minds of many jurors it 
would have inevitably created an inference and in some cases a 
presumption of wrongdoing on the part of those involved. Once 
implanted, the taint cannot help but affect a jury's decision 
making process and where the factual issues are narrow, the 
inference may mean the difference. 
Here, the Court abused its discretion in failing to avoid 
the tendency of the proffered evidence to mislead and prejudice the 
jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the aforementioned claims of error, appellant 
petitions this Court to reverse the District Court's denial of 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial and to remand this case for new 
trial to be conducted in accordance with the opinion of this Court. 
DATED this day of , 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEVEN L. HANSEN 
GREGORY B. WALL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Lingwall was non-suited when the jury had intended Mr. Lingwall 
to recover some damages in compensation for his i n ju r i e s . 
DATED th i s Ar day of December, 1984. 
:SS . 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
December, 1984. 
My commission expires 
ln-(o- %' 
lCfc day of 
NOTARYTPUBLr 
R e s i d i n g a t 
>mmiL 
B a i t Lake County, UT 
- 2 -
AFFIDAVIT OF ORDELL STEPHENS 
ORDELL STEPHENS, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That affiant was a member o 
in the litigation of Belden v. Dalbo, Inc 
(f a jury impaneled 
, et al., Civil No, 
the Honorable Homer F. 
Court of Summit County, 
6749, commenced November 30, 1982, before 
Wilkinson, in the Third Judicial District 
State of Utah. 
2. That during its deliberations, said jury became 
confused due to the nature of the special] verdict and regarding 
the effect their finding of contributory inegligency would have 
on the parties, Martin Lingwall and Dalbq, Inc. 
3. That affiant in his representative capacity as 
a juror requested additional instruction from the Court in a 
desire to eliminate the confusion. 
4. That the Court refused the request and, instead, 
referred the jury to instructions already given. 
5. That said jury returned a special verdict estab-
lishing plaintiff Lingwall 707o negligent and defendant Dalbo, 
Inc. , 307o negligent. In addition, plaintiff Lingwall was 
found to have suffered $69,083.00 in damages from the accident. 
APPENDIX A-2 
6. That the aforementioned verdict did not result 
in the effect desired by the jury, namely, that the plaintiff 
Lingwall was non-suited when the jury had intended Mr. Lingwall 
to recover some damages in compensation for his injuries. 
DATED this [ L day of December, 1984. 
ORDELL STEPHENS / 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• s S 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this | [ ' day 
of December, 1984. 
LUa>. i V^.i'v'wU^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County, UT 
My commission expires: 
i A-fit 
- 2 -
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN HOtT 
KEVIN HOYT, being first duly swprn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That affiant was a member o 
in the litigation of Belden v. Dalbo, Inc 
(f a jury impaneled 
, et al., Civil No, 
6749, commenced November 30, 1982, before) the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, in the Third Judicial! District Court of 
Summit County, State of Utah. 
2. That during its deliberations, said jury became 
confused due to the nature of the specialf verdict and regarding 
the effect their finding of contributory 
on the parties, Martin Lingwall and Dalbd>, Inc. 
3. That affiant in his representative capacity as 
a juror requested additional instruction 
desire to eliminate the confusion. 
negligence would have 
from the Court in a 
That the Court refused the 
referred the jury to instructions already given. 
request and, instead, 
ppecial verdict estab-
and defendant Dalbo, 
5. That said jury returned a 
lishing plaintiff Lingwall 10% negligent 
Inc. , 307o negligent. In addition, plaintiff Lingwall was 
found to have suffered $69,083.00 in damages from the accident, 
APPENDIX A-3 
6. That the aforementioned verdict did not result 
in the effect desired by the jury, namely, that the plaintiff 
Lingwall was non-suited when the jury had intended Mr. Lingwall 
to recover some damages in compensation for his injuries. 
DATED this /0 day of December, 1984. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
i s s 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
December, 19 84. A 
ML 
lOTARY Pl| 
Res idling 
My commission expires: 
JU^day OJ 
muL 
BLrc— 
a t Sa l t Lake County, UT 
- 2 -
AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN L. f^ENRIOD 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, being f i rs t duly s^vorn deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. That the affiant is an attorney for t|he firm of Nielsen £• Senior, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. That aff iant, as counsel, represented the plaint i f f , Martin R. 
Lingwall, in the l i t igation, Beldon v. Dalbo, Inc. let al., heard November 30, 
1982, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, and a j u r y , in the Thi rd 
Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of Utah. 
3. That during its deliberations, the ju ry became confused 
regarding the effect their f inding of comparative negligence would have on the 
parties. 
4. That the ju ry requested additional instruction to eliminate said 
confusion. 
5. That the court denied said request a|nd instead referred the ju ry 
to the instructions already given. 
6. That the aforementioned, though not recorded by the court, was 
witnessed by affiant and other members of the bencfp and court. 
APPENDIX A-4 
f DATED th is y day of December, 1984. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Subscr ibed and sworn to before ime th is 
1004 
day of December, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in xQ^JJ" /fZlJ? / 
My Commission Exp i res : 
- 2 -
